Enrique Núñez-Mussa, School of Journalism, Michigan State University

From 1973 to 1989, Chile was ruled by Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship, marked by repression and the violation of fundamental rights. In this context, opposition magazines like Apsi and Análisis emerged as critical voices. Despite facing harassment and censorship, these publications offered civic information and regime scrutiny during Chile’s democratic transition, notably in the 1988 referendum and 1989 election. Against normative ideals of electoral coverage, their interpretive and emotionally resonant reporting used cynicism and strategic-game framing to portray Pinochet as a political competitor and legitimize opposition leaders. Apsi and Análisis demonstrated how oppositional media can support democratic values under repressive regimes by embracing moral judgment and challenging notions of journalistic objectivity.

For fifteen years, Chile existed without democratic elections. A military coup on September 11, 1973, overthrew socialist President Salvador Allende and installed General Augusto Pinochet, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, alongside a military junta. The dictatorship established torture centers, disappeared opponents through its intelligence agency, forced others into exile, and curtailed fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression. A press censorship office was created the day after the coup, and only two newspapers were authorized to operate, effectively shutting down all other publications.^[1] This oppression of the press evolved in tandem with the regime’s institutional structure. By the end of 1973, the censorship office became the Directorate of Social Communication, which enforced prior censorship, spread official propaganda, and imposed sanctions.^[2] Media outlets were under direct review of their content^[3] and an official press was created to support the regime’s disinformation strategies.^[4] Oppositional journalists were detained, exiled, or murdered.

In this environment, a loophole allowed the publication of magazines that only covered international news, giving rise to opposition magazines.^[5] This essay focuses on two such publications: Apsi and Análisis. Both gradually began to include domestic content as the country advanced toward democratic transition, reporting human rights abuses and highlighting opposition leaders, both examples of journalism that made them targets of censorship and persecution.^[6] While other similar magazines such as Cauce and Hoy were relevant, Apsi was selected for being the first, published in 1976, and Análisis for being the most persecuted,^[7] as evidenced by the assassination of its international editor, José Carrasco Tapia, in 1986.

This essay examines how Apsi and Análisis covered the elections that marked Chile’s return to democracy. These include the 1988 referendum that posed a binary choice: vote “Yes” to extend Pinochet’s rule until 1997 or “No” to trigger democratic elections for president and parliament. Following the “No” victory, the essay also examines the 1989 presidential election.

From this review, three main arguments emerge. First, during both elections, these opposition magazines developed electoral coverage repertoires that contributed to democratization by scrutinizing the regime, offering context, and providing civic information. Second, the coverage was interpretive and its lack of neutrality was what, in a dictatorship context, led this journalism to contribute to the democratization process.^[8] Third, the magazines adopted a strategic-game frame,^[9] often criticized in democracies for fostering political cynicism.^[10] However, under authoritarianism, cynicism was a journalistic tool that portrayed the regime as a competitor. Although the dictatorship set the game’s rules, it became a player.

Scrutiny, Context, and Civic Information

During the examined period, the magazines typically opened with articles summarizing weekly events from an interpretive perspective. It was common that the stories challenged Pinochet and the official regime’s narrative. As the referendum campaign progressed, exposing the regime’s propaganda became routine. For instance, Análisis published a fact-checking article debunking the testimonies shown in the pro-Pinochet television campaign.^[11]

The magazines also monitored the regime-friendly press, describing unethical relationships. One case involved political journalists receiving Christmas gifts like supermarket vouchers and Sony tape recorders from the regime.^[12] Before the referendum, readers were advised to follow results via radio and the Catholic University’s TV channel, which was presented as more principled journalism due to its dual accreditation with both the regime’s press office and the opposition campaign. One article noted: “This reinforces assumptions that this station’s information on referendum day will be more complete and objective than that of the National Television (aligned with the ‘Yes’ option).”^[13][14]

The 1988 referendum was the first campaign in Chile’s history to feature televised segments, which became a subject of analysis for these publications. Apsi ran a cover contrasting the regime’s message with the opposition in their television advertisements: “Between Terror and Joy.”^[15] The following issue expanded on the theme: “Government’s Campaign of Terror: That Tempting Resource.”^[16] Meanwhile, Análisis examined through historical contextualization the new ways of experiencing electoral campaigns in two articles comparing modern technologies and costs with those of the last democratic election in 1970.^[17] It emphasized the rise of marketing, television’s dominance, and the regime’s control of propaganda: “The electoral campaign up to December 14 will involve computers, telefax machines, giant screens, video, and heavy makeup. Candidates, especially presidential ones, must learn to use this modern technology, which, unevenly, now serves politics.”^[18]

Despite skepticism about the referendum and the 1989 election, the magazines did not discourage voting. Instead, they promoted opposition efforts to ensure transparency, highlighting the role of poll watchers and an independent vote-counting center.^[19] The publications also provided civic information: how to behave on election day (e.g., don’t celebrate prematurely),^[20] how parliament would function,^[21] what electoral laws entailed,^[22] and how to amend the constitution drafted under the dictatorship.^[23]

Interpretive Coverage

These opposition magazines embraced a journalism committed to democratization. Their reporting drew a clear distinction between wrong and right. The articles have constant moral judgements constructed in binary terms: the dictatorship is wrong, democracy is right. The dictatorship represents terror; democracy, joy. Although the magazines have sections dedicated to opinion, even straight stories include editorial resources like irony. In addition, sections devoted to humor with comics, photo montages, and texts feature multiple portrayals of Pinochet caricatured as a defeated figure (see Figures 1 and 2). In Apsi, a columnist pretends to be a regime-aligned TV critic who praises the dictatorship’s propaganda to mock its crudeness.^[24] Análisis ran a regular feature classifying public figures such as “ubicado” (appropriate), “desubicado” (inappropriate), and “carépalo” (shameless), proposing a moral compass.^[25]

In its issue before the referendum, Análisis declares the rejection of Pinochet as the likely outcome, and some texts adopt a lyrical tone. One editor wrote: “The ‘No’ voter arrives at the polling station to leave, with a simple graphite mark, a reflection of their soul.”^[26] A report on opposition rallies adopted the campaign slogan “Joy Is Coming”: “Joy Swept Across Chile.” The article celebrated that people could mobilize freely for the first time: “The event was long, perhaps too long. But people stayed until the end. It had been years, too many years, since the residents of the Fourth Region, like most of the country, could gather and demonstrate. The Joy March made it possible.” Interviews with a shopkeeper and a party leader echoed the belief that rejecting the regime was an ethical imperative.^[27]

The writing in both magazines acknowledged their role as historical documents, aimed to preserve a version of events unfiltered by the official discourse. As the editorial of a special edition of Análisis declared after Patricio Aylwin’s democratic victory as Chile’s President: “This effort aims to create a record. A small document that allows us to relive two days of extreme intensity. To synthesize the feelings of millions in written words and graphic documentation as they reconnect with a democratic path.”^[28]

Strategic-Game Framing

Before the referendum, the regime and the political right had to present a continuity candidate in case of a “Yes” victory. While it seemed obvious that Pinochet would run, Apsi reported on internal disagreements, including voices that favored a civilian candidate. One headline captured Pinochet’s ambition with the title: “His Mad Desire to Be Nominated.”^[29] Both magazines treated Pinochet as a competitor, often using the term “candidate.”^[30] An Apsi cover portrayed him as Santa Claus with the headline: “Upcoming measures to win votes: The Candidate’s Big Giveaway.”^[31] The de facto ruler was portrayed as someone who needed to win support within the upper echelons of power and the public. His actions and propaganda were interpreted strategically, with cynicism conveyed through irony.

One article noted that polls had become the “vedette” of the referendum.^[32] Traditionally used within the strategic frame to rank the relevance of candidates, distinguishing likely winners from losers, in this case, polls served to voice public sentiment. As Análisis wrote: “Poll: Nobody Likes Pinochet.”^[33] Coverage of protests, marches, and large campaign events in support of the opposition were portrayed as celebratory and peaceful,^[34] breaking with traditional hegemonic coverage of social movements,^[35] and it served to depict the collective motivation for democracy.

Simultaneously, opposition leaders were covered in a competitive light, even before the referendum.^[36] Análisis featured an issue titled “The Race for the Presidency,” profiling potential candidates.^[37] Once the presidential nominees were finalized, coverage favored the opposition, framing its candidate as the likely winner well before the election. In contrast, the regime-backed candidate was depicted as already defeated. A caricature in Análisis mocked him with a noose around his neck.^[38]

Conclusion

The coverage repertoires examined in this essay illustrate how journalistic practices adapt to context. In this sense, a strategic-game frame can take on a positive role when confronting a powerful force that seeks to eliminate competition. This frame exposed the strategies of that power with cynicism, positioning the dictator as a competitor, and opened the path for other competitors to emerge. These magazines operated under the constraints of a dictatorship, developing forms of coverage in which interpretation challenged the regime’s official discourse and fostered an oppositional voice that supported the institutionalization of democratic transition. Their repertoire combined civic-mindedness with cynicism, emotionality, contextualization, and moral judgement. These publications exemplify how having clear ethical commitments, such as upholding democracy over authoritarianism, can be compatible with journalism that does not claim neutrality or objectivity, yet advances freedom of expression, human rights, and civic and civil liberties.

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^[1] “Bando No 15,” Proclamation, September 11, 1973, Le Monde Diplomatique Chile, https://www.lemondediplomatique.cl/2023/09/bando-no-15-del-11-de-septiembre-de-1973-aun-vigente-hoy.html (accessed May 22, 2025).

^[2] Cristina Moyano Barahona and Carla Rivera Aravena, “Disputando lo político: La izquierda y la prensa política de masas en Chile, 1950–1989” [Disputing the Political: The Left and the Mass Political Press in Chile, 1950–1989], Universum (Talca. En línea) 35, no. 1 (2020): 355, https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-23762020000100340.

^[3] For example, the state-owned broadcaster, Televisión Nacional de Chile, was subject to direct intervention, with military officers holding executive positions, while the other university-affiliated channels experienced indirect control through the appointment of university presidents by the regime. See Guillermo Sunkel and Eugenio Tironi.”Modernización de las comunicaciones y democratización de la política: Los medios en la transición a la democracia en Chile” [Modernization of Communications and Democratization of Politics: The Media in Chile’s Transition to Democracy], Estudios Públicos 52 (1993): 221-22, https://estudiospublicos.cl/index.php/cep/article/view/1309

^[4] There is documented evidence of newspaper networks collaborating with the regime to manipulate information and disseminate disinformation. One example is Operation Colombo, in which three newspapers owned by El Mercurio, along with the daily La Tercera, published false information to cover up the murder of regime opponents. See Mónica González, “El rol de los medios en la Operación Colombo” [The Role of the Media in Operation Colombo], CIPER Chile, May 29, 2008, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2008/05/29/el-rol-de-los-medios-en-la-operacion-colombo/.

^[5] Moyano Barahona and Rivera Aravena, “Disputando lo político” 353.

^[6] Aldo Nicolás Maldonado Oyarzo, “Redes informativas y estrategias periodísticas de las revistas opositoras APSI, Análisis y Hoy durante la dictadura cívico-militar en Chile (1981–1986)” [Informative Networks and Journalistic Strategies of the Opposition Magazines APSI, Análisis, and Hoy During the Civic-Military Dictatorship in Chile, 1981–1986], Amoxtli 12 (2024): , https://doi.org/10.38123/amox12.412; Sunkel and Tironi, “Modernización de las comunicaciones.”

^[7] Moyano Barahona and Rivera Aravena, “Disputando lo político,” 340.

^[8] Other authors have recognized the value these magazines had in the country’s democratization process, as they contributed to legitimizing political activity and provided coverage of the opposition. See Sunkel and Tironi, “Modernización de las comunicaciones.”; Moyano Barahona and Rivera Aravena, “Disputando lo político”.

^[9]  Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese propose four variables to identify a strategic-game frame: profiling winners and losers, using sports and war language, citing polls, and focusing on election results. See Toril Aalberg, Jesper Strömbäck, and Claes H. de Vreese, “The Framing of Politics as Strategy and Game: A Review of Concepts, Operationalizations and Key Findings,” Journalism 13, no. 2 (2012): 162–178, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911427799.

^[10] Alon Zoizner, “The Consequences of Strategic News Coverage for Democracy: A Meta-Analysis,” Communication Research 48, no. 1 (2021): 325, https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650218808691; Matthijs Elenbaas and Claes H. de Vreese, “The Effects of Strategic News on Political Cynicism and Vote Choice Among Young Voters,” Journal of Communication 58, no. 3 (September 2008): 550–567, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00399.x.

^[11] Felipe Pozo, “La franja del ‘Sí: ‘Para mentir y comer pescado…’” Análisis, no. 247 (October 3–9, 1988): 29–30.

^[12] “Pinochet Pascuero,” Apsi, no. 233 (January 4–10, 1988): 3.

^[13] All translations are the author’s.

^[14] “Cómo será el 5 de octubre,” Apsi, no. 272 (October 3–9, 1988): 10.

^[15] Rodrigo Moulian, “Propaganda política en televisión: Entre el terror y la alegría,” Apsi, no. 269 (September 1–18, 1988): 21–23.

^[16] Nibaldo Fabrizio Mosciatti, “Campaña del terror gubernamental: Ese recurso que tienta,” Apsi, no. 270 (September 19–25, 1988): 4–6.

^[17] Iván Badilla, “Últimas elecciones: ¿Veinte años no es nada?” Análisis, no. 308 (December 11–17, 1989): 18–20; Iván Badilla, “Campañas electorales: ¿Cuánto cuesta ser candidato?” Análisis, no. 286 (July 3–9, 1989): 33–37.

^[18] Iván Badilla, “Campañas electorales: ¿Cuánto cuesta ser candidato?”: 37.

^[19] Patricia Moscoso and Milena Vodanovic, “Control opositor del plebiscito: La fina red del cómputo paralelo,” Apsi, no. 271 (September 25–October 2, 1988): 11–13; Iván Badilla, “El 14 de diciembre: Todo bajo control,” Análisis, no. 308 (December 4–10, 1989): 10–11.

^[20]  “Cómo será el 5 de octubre,” Apsi, no. 272 (October 3–9, 1988): 10; Libio Perez, “Cinco de octubre: La hora de la verdad,” Análisis, no. 247 (October 3–9, 1988): 5-8.

^[21] Ivan Badilla, “Composición del senado: El jamón del sandwich,” Análisis, no. 297 (September 18–24, 1989): 8–9.

^[22] Marilú Velasco, “Ley electoral: Problemática y febril,” Apsi, no. 328 (October 30–November 5, 1989): I–IV.

^[23] Felipe Pozo, “La constitución: Ese oscuro objeto de reformas,” Análisis, no. 252 (November 7–13, 1988): 18–20.

^[24] Mouat, Francisco, “Propaganda política en televisión: La planadora del Sí.” Apsi, no. 271 (September 25–October 2, 1988): 20.

^[25] In Chile, these are colloquial ways of referring to someone who behaves appropriately or not. The section appears regularly, but one notable case is an edition in which Pinochet is labeled as the “ubicado” or “appropriate” for appointing opposition figures to the Central Bank. The designation is written humorously, inviting a double reading of his actions. In the same issue, the cover features a defeated-looking Pinochet with the word “¡Chao!” (Goodbye!). See “Buscando el ubicatex,” Análisis, no. 309 (December 11–17, 1989): 41.

^[26] Fernando Paulsen, “5 de octubre de 1988: ¿Cuántos años tiene un día?” Análisis, no. 247 (October 3–9, 1988): 4.

^[27] Ivan Badilla and Pamela Jiles, “Movilizaciones: La alegría recorrió Chile,” Análisis, no. 247 (October 3–9, 1988): 15–20.

^[28] “Presentación,” Análisis, no. 310 (December 18–24, 1989): 3.

^[29] Bárbara Hayes, “Las locas ganas de ser nominado,” Apsi, no. 233 (January 4–10, 1988): 8–9.

^[30] Carlos Bau, “El candidato,” Análisis, no. 211 (January 25–31, 1988): 2; Nibaldo Fabrizio Mosciatti, “La sombra negativa del candidato,” Apsi, no. 259 (July 4–10, 1988): 5–6.

^[31] “Próximas medidas para ganar votos: El ofertón del candidato,” Apsi, no. 261 (July 18–24, 1988), cover.

^[32] Felipe Pozo, “Una campaña que hizo historia: El largo camino al triunfo,” Análisis, no. 248 (October 10–16, 1988).

^[33] Ivan Badilla, “Encuesta: nadie quiere a Pinochet,” Análisis, no. 249 (October 17–23, 1988).

^[34] Badilla y Jiles: 15-20; Marcia Scantelbury, “Aylwin en la décima región: Como ‘pato’ en el agua,” Análisis, no. 305 (November 13–19, 1988): 10–12.

^[35] Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

^[36] Rodrigo Moulian, “La DC busca candidato,” Apsi, no. 235 (January 18–24, 1988): 13–14.

^[37] “Perfil de los candidatos: La carrera por el sillón,” Análisis, no. 251 (October 31–November 8, 1988), entire issue.

^[38] Análisis, no. 308 (December 11–17, 1989), entire issue.